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Daugherty: Daugherty: Missouri Non-Partisan Court Plan:

The Missouri Non-Partisan Court Plan:
A Dinosaur on the Edge of Extinction
or a Survivor in a Changing
Socio-Legal Environment?
The HonorableJay A. Daugherty*

I. INTRODUCTION
Surveys have shown that as America's distrust of the political system
increases, so does its unfavorable perception of the judiciary.' This distrust and
unfavorable perception result in declining retention percentages for judges and
2
challenges to the merit selection system by minorities and legislatures.
Although the authority of the courts is grounded in the law, that authority
ultimately depends on the public's knowledge and trust in the courts. If public
knowledge and trust in the courts has eroded, the result may be new and varied
challenges against non-partisan or merit selection plans, with outcries from the
legislatures and minorities to repudiate such plans and return the judiciary to
partisan politics. This article focuses on the challenges to the merit selection of
judges. It will provide a historical overview of the Missouri Non-Partisan Court
Plan ("the Plan") and its expansion across the country. The article will explore
the positive and negative aspects of the Plan and examine traditional criticisms
levied against it. Declining voter confidence in merit system states will be
discussed, and the article will analyze and report on declining retention
percentages in Missouri and their implications on the Plan. Furthermore, recent
attacks in Missouri on the merit selection system by minority groups and the
state legislature will be studied. After examining the challenges to the Plan and
exploring their possibility of success, the article will provide suggestions and
observations to both challengers and defenders of the Plan.

* Circuit Judge for the 16th Judicial Circuit Court of Missouri, Division 13.
University of Missouri-Columbia (B.S. Public Administration); University of MissouriKansas City School of Law (J.D.); University of Nevada/National Judicial College
(Masters in the Judiciary).
1. Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, What Twenty Years of JudicialRetention
Elections Have Told Us, 70 JUDICATURE 340, 347 (1987).
2. Id.
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II. EVOLUTION OF THE MISSOURI
NON-PARTISAN COURT PLAN
The method by which judges are chosen for office has been an important
part ofjudicial history since the birth of our nation. Historically, the method of
selection and retention of judges has been controversial,3 with all aspects of
society involved in the debate over how judges should be selected. The essence
of this debate is the search for a selection system that increases public
participation, but reduces politics. It is characterized by the tension between
judicial accountability and judicial independence. 4

A. JudicialSelection in the UnitedStates Priorto the Missouri Plan
At the time of its formation, our nation adopted the appointive judicial
selection system from England.5 The Founders were tom between the exclusive
selection ofjudges by the executive branch versus a direct election ofjudges by
a populace they distrusted.6 Consequently, "[i]n order to protect judicial
independence, a majority of the states provided for lifetime appointments,
subject to good behavior. Popular elections for judges were unheard of."' At the
beginning of the nineteenth century, political populism emerged in America, led
by Presidents Jefferson and Jackson.' This populism clashed directly with the
judiciary when Chief Justice John Marshall announced in Marburyv. Madison9
that judges could overturn laws passed by legislatures.' 0 Public criticism of the
judiciary grew as both Jefferson and Jackson attacked the judges' lack of
accountability." The populist movement, seeking accountability for elected
officials, was dedicated to the concept of direct elections. Thus, evolution of
judicial selection in the nineteenth century was characterized by a movement
from executive appointment to contested partisan elections. By the latter part of

3. Joseph R. Grodin, Developing a Consensus of Constraint: A Judge's
Prospectiveon JudicialRetention Elections, 61 S.CAL. L. REV. 1969, 1970, 1972 (1988).
4. William Jenkins, Jr., Retention Elections: Who Wins When No One Cares?, 61
JUDICATURE 79 (1977).
5. Hon. Elmo B. Hunter, Revisiting the History and Success ofMerit Selection in
Missouriand Elsewhere, 60 UMKC L. REv. 69, 69 (1991).
6. John M. Roll, Merit Selection: The Arizona Experience, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 837,
839 (1990).
7. Grodin, supra note 3, at 1970.
8. Grodin, supra note 3, at 1971.
9. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
10. Grodin, supranote 3, at 1971 n.7.
11. Roll, supranote 6, at 841.
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the nineteenth century, most state judges in the United States were elected in
contested partisan elections.' 2
Unfortunately, by the late 1800s and early 1900s, the practice of electing
judges, while representing a democratic ideal, often degraded into the selection
of machine sponsored judicial "hacks."'" In 1906, Professor Roscoe Pound, the
future dean of the Harvard Law School, criticized the direct election ofjudges
as being inconsistent with the standards of quality and independence expected
of the judicial branch. He argued that a partisan election compelled ajudge "to
become a politician, [and] in many jurisdictions ha[d] almost destroyed the
traditional respect for the bench."' 4 In response to these concerns, a search for
alternatives began. For a time, the election ofjudges in non-partisan contested
elections gained support, but that was also deemed a failure, as unqualified
candidates could win elections by aggressive campaigning. 5 The most obvious
alternative was the federal appointive model, but in light of continued populist
feelings, a third model was put forward containing a retention vote component.16
During this era, the judicial "independence versus accountability" debate
was recast in terms of "formalist versus realist." 7 Many scholars asserted that
judges make decisions as "formalists," such that law is a system of rules
supplemented by principles which are capable of being discovered and applied
without the discretion of the judge. If this were the situation, then most would
agree that the direct election of judges makes no sense.'" On the other hand,
"legal realists" argued that judicial decisions were simply the product of a
judge's personality. "If this were true, then the direct election of judges makes
perfect sense."' 9 Unfortunately, neither of these theories adequately describes
the true judicial function. The modem judge is a melange of the "formalist" and
"realist" prototypes. Precedent is usually followed, and decisions are commonly
reached objectively and dispassionately. However, at times, judges must act
subjectively and more like legislators. For these and other philosophical and
political reasons, compromise plans, including merit selection, began to emerge
in the 1930s and 1940s.

12. Roll, supranote 6, at 841.
13. Roll, supranote 6, at 842-43. For example, Thomas Pendergast exercised great
control over judicial elections in Kansas City, while Tammany Hall did the same in New
York City. See supranotes 21-25 and accompanying text.
14. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of PopularDissatisfactionwith the Administration
AM. JUDICATURE SOc'Y 178, 186 (1962).
ofJustice, 20 J.
15. Glenn R. Winters, Selection ofJudges-An HistoricalIntroduction, 44 TEX.
L. REV.1081, 1083 (1966).
16. Grodin, supra note 3, at 1971.
17. Grodin, supranote 3, at 1973-74.
18. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 38-39 (1977).
19. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 108-17 (1936).
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Merit selection methods of choosing judges began to develop publicly
around 1913, with the founding of the American Judicature Society (AJS). This
organization supported the development of an independent, apolitical judiciary.
Its leaders believed that merit selection and retention was a compromise between
pure appointive and pure elective methods." Their belief was that merit
selection would be politically acceptable and would create an opportunity for a
more independent and less political state judiciary. In developing a plan for the
selection of judges, numerous proposals were put forth over several years, with
three essential components emerging: (1) the recommendation of several
judicial nominees based solely on merit by a commission, (2) the selection of
ajudge from the list of recommended judges by an elected official (usually chief
justice or governor) and (3) noncompetitive retention elections.2' Such plans
were referred to as "commission plans" due to their use of a commission for
initial recommendations of judicial candidates.
B. JudicialSelection in Missouri
At the turn of the century in most of the heavily populated areas of the
country, "political machines" and "party bosses" began to control the election
of state judges; such was the case in Missouri.' Thomas Pendergast, the "party
boss" in Kansas City, and later Harry Truman's benefactor, controlled most of
the significant elections throughout the state. "At times, the results flowing from
this system ranged from the ludicrous to the near chaotic."' Judges found their
tenure on the bench at risk irrespective of their ability, merit, or service as a
judge. 4 A judge's position in Missouri under "machine politics" was so tenuous
that between 1918 and 1941 only twice was a state supreme court judge reelected.25 Consequently, concerned citizens, jurists and lawyers began numerous
attempts to legislatively create a "commission plan" ofjudicial selection. When
these efforts failed, they organized petitions to place the Missouri Non-Partisan
Court Plan on the ballot. In 1940, despite the efforts of the "political machines,"
the Missouri Plan passed statewide by over 80,000 votes.26 After its passage,

20. Michael R. Belknap, From Pound to Harley, the Founding of AJS, 72
JUDICATURE 78 (1988).
21. Roll, supranote 6, at 842-43.
22. Hunter, supranote 5, at 70.
23. Hunter, supranote 5, at 70.
24. Hunter, supranote 5, at 70.

25. Hunter, supranote 5, at 70.
26. Norman Krivosha, In Celebration ofthe 50th Anniversary ofMerit Selection,
74 JUDICATURE 128, 131 (1990); LYLE WARICK, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE UNITED

STATES: A COMPENDIUM OF PROVISIONS (1993). When initially passed in 1940, the
Missouri Plan covered the Supreme Court of Missouri, the three Missouri Courts of
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss2/3
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there were several unsuccessful attempts to repeal the Plan.27 Since the initial
passage of the Missouri Plan, over thirty-three states and the District of
Columbia have adopted some form of the Missouri Plan, making it the most
popular method of judicial election in America.28
Under the Missouri Plan, judges are initially appointed by the governor,
who selects from a list of three nominees who are recommended by a judicial
commission. At the next general election within the first year on the bench,
judges must face the voters in a retention election. Judges who receive
affirmative votes in this uncontested retention election of at least fifty percent
earn a full six year term in office if a trial judge or a twelve year term if an
appellate judge.29
Few would argue with the proposition that the Missouri Plan's expectations
and goals are laudable. The Plan seeks to improve the selection process and
promote superior decision making from the bench by emphasizing professional
qualifications rather than political influence.30 More specifically, advocates
maintain that the merit selection process provides the following benefits: (1) the
quality of applicants is improved; (2) a pre-appointment screening process is
provided; (3) judges are removed from politics, emphasizing professional
qualifications rather than political influence; (4) judges need not campaign or
solicit campaign funds; (5) the large number ofjudicial offices make contested
judicial elections impractical; (6) judicial stability is promoted; and (7) retention
elections provide for democratic participation. 3'
However, the most popular judicial selection system may not be the best.
Opponents of a merit selection system argue: (1) merit selection is
undemocratic; (2) judges are selected by small elite groups; (3) merit selection
allows for removal, but not selection; (4) politics is still a factor at the
nomination and appointment level; (5) it is a secretive process; (6) bar polls do
not accurately reflect the interest of32citizens; and (7) contested elections make
judges accountable and responsive.
Whether or not the Missouri Plan has achieved its expected goals, "the
impact of the Missouri Plan on American state judicial systems cannot be

Appeals and the Circuit Court of Jackson County (Kansas City) and the City of St. Louis.
Hunter, supra note 5, at 71. While additional metropolitan areas of the state have also
enacted the Missouri Plan, other areas of the state still utilize partisan contested elections.
27. Krivosha, supranote 26, at 131.
28. Krivosha, supranote 26, at 131.
29. MO. CONST. art. V, § 25(c)(1).
30. Henry R. Glick, The Promise and the Performance of the Missouri Plan:
JudicialSelection in the Fifty States, 32 U. MIAMI L. REv. 509 (1978).

31. Id at510,512-13.
32. Id.at 513-23.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997

5

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 3
MISSOURILA WREVIEW

[Vol. 62

underestimated. 33 Every state that has changed its method ofjudicial selection
in the past forty-five years has adopted some form of the Missouri Plan and no
state that has adopted the Missouri Plan has moved to some other method of
judicial selection? 4 There have been no substantive changes to the non-partisan
court plan method of selection and retention in Missouri. The judges selected
utilizing the Plan have enjoyed high retention rates and have seldom been voted
out of office.35
C. Erosion ofRetention Percentagesfor Missouri Plan
Judges and the EnsuingPanic
After its enactment in 1940, Missouri judges selected under the Plan
routinely were retained by percentages that often approached ninety percent.36
For a period of over forty years, affirmative vote retention percentages for
Missouri judges seldom fell below an average of seventy-five to eighty percent3
In the early 1980s, Missouri voters' support for judges selected under the
Missouri Plan began to erode.3" After the 1984 retention election, affirmative
vote percentages began a steady decline.39 In 1986, Missouri Plan judges
received an average retention percentage of seventy-two percent to seventy-five
percent. This was somewhat below their historical percentages, but still not
cause for concem among Plan supporters." In 1990, however, the retention
percentage fell dramatically to an average of fifty-seven percent. This sudden
erosion of support created concern among the judiciary and the bar. Many
supporters of the Plan worried that competent and experienced judges would not
be retained in the next judicial election of 1992, even though judicial scandal and
controversy were almost non-existent.'
Approaching the November 1992 retention election, it appeared that the
nationally acclaimed and emulated Missouri Plan was in danger of extinction in
the state of its birth. If a drop in retention percentages occurred in 1992 as had
occurred between 1988 and 1990, scores of the Missouri Plan judges would be
ousted. Judges, attorneys and bar leaders who had previously ignored gradual

33. Id. at 509.
34. Id. at 510.
35. Mo. CONST. art. V, § 25(c)(1).
36. Based on a review of election results from the Missouri Secretary of State for
non-partisan judges from 1940-1996. See also Aspin & Hall, supranote 1,at 344-46.
37. See supranote 36.

38. See supranote 36.
39. See supranote 36.
40. See supranote 36.
41. Thomas Jackman, Judges FearFallingPrey to Voter Anger, KANSAS CITY
STAR, Dec. 2, 1991, at Al.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss2/3
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declines were suddenly awakened by the dramatic realization that the Missouri
Plan was in danger of collapse. They believed that if judges could not expect
competent service to ensure retention, then no competent attorney would
consider becoming a judge, for fear that he or she could face a potentially
unsuccessful retention election one year later.42
The irony of the erosion of affirmative votes for the Missouri Plan judges
is that it had not been occurring in conjunction with any "coordinated" attack by
interest groups, the legislature, or any other group. Yet with the Missouri NonPartisan Court Plan wounded by declining retention percentages, the "buzzards"
began to circle. In the state legislature, a bill was introduced that would increase
the required retention percentage for judges to sixty percent.4 3 Also, a term
limitation amendment for judges was introduced." Both of these proposals
occurred after a Missouri appellate court refused to strike down term limitation
amendments enacted against legislators. Almost simultaneously, minority
groups opened the assault against the Plan. A lawsuit was filed in the federal
district court in St. Louis seeking to utilize the Voting Rights Act to strike down
the Missouri Plan.4 s In addition to these attacks, it appeared that the emergence
of Ross Perot as a presidential candidate might coalesce anti-establishment and
anti-incumbency forces in the 1992 elections. The fear among judges was that,
to a voter, a judge on a "retention" ballot may appear as an incumbent seeking
re-election.

46

These cumulative events caused near panic among supporters of the
Missouri Plan. The supporters of the Plan believed the selection system had
worked reasonably well for fifty years. Judges, bar leaders and concerned
politicians met to develop a strategy to "save" the Missouri Plan from what they
believed would be its possible defeat. 47 The strategy implemented by supporters
of the Plan was broad and multi-dimensional: a Citizens Committee, headed by
former United States Senator Thomas Eagleton, raised nearly $400,000 to run
radio ads in major media markets extolling the virtues of the Plan; bar leaders
conducted an extensive attorney survey of the judges rating them in various
categories; the results of these judicial surveys were widely distributed
42. James W. Scott, Editorial, MissouriCourtPlan in Danger,KANSAS

CITY STAR,

Feb. 7, 1992, at C6. See also Jackman, supranote 41.
Under the Missouri Plan, a judge must file for retention within one year of
appointment.
43. S.J. Res. 1, 87th Leg., 1st Sess. (Mo. 1992).
44. H.R.J. Res. 4, 6, 86th Leg., 1st Sess. (Mo. 1992).
45. African-American Voting Rights Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Missouri, No.
4:92CV00973 (E.D. Mo. 1993). See infra Part V.
46. Gregory Casey & David Leuthold, Voter Attitudes in the 1992 Missouri

Judicial Retention Elections: Statewide Survey and Exit Poll Conducted for the Missouri
Bar (1992).
47. Id. at 1-2.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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throughout the state; bar leaders and citizen committee members spoke to groups
and urged newspaper editorial boards to support the Plan; and judges embarked
on a campaign to educate the public about their work and the benefits of the
Missouri Plan by holding "judicial forums" or "town meetings."48 The results
of the retention election gave both the attackers and the defenders of the Plan a
report card on the effectiveness of their efforts. Judges received average
retention percentages of sixty-two percent, with all but one judge being retained
statewide.49
The 1994 retention election was somewhat less vitriolic, but contained most
of the same conflicting elements as the 1992 election. The 1994 vote resulted
in similar retention results and percentages as that of 1992.50 The 1996 judicial
retention election resulted in average favorable percentages of 66.5 percent.5 '
It is uncertain whether this modest increase in the retention percentage signals
the beginning of a return to pre-1988 retention percentage levels or is simply the
2
result of an election year where incumbency was no longer a disadvantage.1
III. JUDICIAL RETENTION ELECTIONS AND
VOTER ATTITUDE SURVEYS

As explained earlier, in its simplest form a non-partisan court plan is a
compromise between the goals ofjudicial independence and accountability to the
public for judicial actions. While this system of selection and retention appears
popular, it remains controversial. Neither the champions of accountability nor
the advocates of independence are completely satisfied with the Plan's method
53
of selection and retention.
In addition to the typical criticisms of the Missouri Plan explained
earlier,' there are at least five other significant criticisms of the judicial retention
election process. These criticisms are that: (1) judicial retention elections
insulate judges from the populace, since few judges are defeated in retention
elections and the public is not a factor in enforcing judicial accountability;" (2)
judicial retention elections attract the smallest voter turnout of all types of
elections, apparently because many voters feel they lack sufficient information

48. Id
49. Based on a review of election results from the Missouri Secretary of State's
Office for all non-partisan judges in 1992.
50. See supra note 49.
51. See supranote 49.
52. See infra Part IV.

53. Jenkins, supranote 4, at 80.
54. See supranote 32 and accompanying text.
55. See supra note 36.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss2/3
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to cast an informed vote; 6 (3) judicial retention elections are boring, and the
level of public knowledge about judges and judicial retention elections is
unusually low; 7 (4) political guides such, as party labels, which are known to
play an important role in providing information to voters, are conspicuously
absent; 8 and (5) judicial retention elections have resulted in essentially lifetime
tenure for judges, as evidenced by the fact that only one percent of judges
seeking retention have been defeated in retention elections.5 9
In one of the few studies of retention elections, Aspin and Hall analyzed
affirmative retention voting in ten states from the period of 1964 through 1984.1
In analyzing more than 1,864 elections, they found the mean affirmative vote for
retaining judges to be 77.2 percent.6 ' During this time period, only twenty-two
judges were defeated. These twenty-two defeats in 1,864 elections support the
conclusion that non-partisan court plan judges have a high degree of
independence and are insulated from the public. 2
An interesting trend begins to emerge from the study of this twenty year
period. From 1964 to 1984, the retention vote decreased from a mean
affirmative vote of approximately eighty-five percent in the early 1960's to a low
of 73.8 percent in 1978.63 Aspin and Hall's research indicated that one plausible
explanation of the variation in the mean affirmative vote is that political trust is
the major factor in judicial retention elections.' The decline in trust for all major
American institutions that occurred during this same time helps to explain the
changes in the mean affirmative vote. Also, the voters' lack of differentiation
between the judges in the same geographical area is apparent. This lack of
variation of individual judges is most evident when multiple judge districts had
judges on the ballot in the same election. In Aspin and Hall's study, 1,057
elections were compared and 75.5 percent of the judges fell within three
percentage points of the mean in multi-judge districts.65 This finding suggests
that voters are casting retention votes not based on the performance from the

56. Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, Retention Elections andJudicialBehavior,

77 JUDICATURE 306, 307 (1994).
57. Philip Dubois, Voter Turnout in State JudicialElections: An Analysis ofthe
Tail on an ElectoralKite, 41 J. POL. 865 (1979).
58. Joel Goldstein, Bar PollRatings as the LeadingInfluence on a Non-Partisan
JudicialElection, 63 JUDICATURE 377 (1980).
59. African-American Voting Rights Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Missouri, No.
4:92CV00973 (E.D. Mo. 1993).
60. Aspin & Hall, supranote 1, at 343.
61. Aspin & Hall, supra note 1, at 343.
62. Aspin & Hall, supranote 1, at 344.
63. Aspin & Hall, supranote 1, at 344.

64. Aspin & Hall, supranote 1, at 344.
65. Aspin & Hall, supranote 1, at 346.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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bench, decisions rendered, etc., but based on generalized cues. This statistic
reinforced Aspin and Hall's belief that political trust is a major voting cue in
judicial retention elections.
The first state to utilize retention elections, Missouri, has displayed a similar
decline in affirmative retention votes for judges." Mean affirmative retention
votes for major trial courts in Missouri declined from a high of eighty-four
percent in 1968 to a low of fifty-seven percent in 1990.67 The most recent mean
affirmative retention vote was sixty-eight percent in 1996.68 Each successive
retention election does not result in declining affirmative vote totals, but the
overall trend points to a declining level of affirmative votes for major trial courts,
with the low point occurring in 1990.' Again, this steady decline appears to run
concurrent with, and is probably related to, the decline of trust in the
government, which has also been fairly steady, since it was first measured in
1958.
After the dramatic decline in affirmative votes for retention of nearly eight
percent from the 1988 to the 1990 election, the Missouri Bar commissioned a
survey seeking to learn more about voter attitudes on judicial retention and their
knowledge of the judiciary.7" The survey found that voter knowledge of the
judiciary was limited. The survey revealed that: two-thirds of the voters
surveyed had never served on a jury; three-fourths had never been a party to a
court action; over half had never watched a court in session; two-thirds did not
66. Aspin & Hall, supra note 1, at 345.
67. Aspin & Hall, supra note 1, at 343, 345. The statistics for the years 1964-84
were based on the Aspin and Hall statistical survey. Statistics for 1986-94 were compiled
by the writer from vote totals as reported to the Secretary of State of Missouri.
68. Aspin & Hall, supra note 1, at 345.
69. Aspin & Hall, supra note 1, at 345.
70. Gregory Casey & David A. Leuthold, Voter Attitudes in the 1992 Missouri
Judicial Retention Elections: Statewide Survey and Exit Poll Conducted for the Missouri
Bar (1992). This is a report on a statewide survey conducted from September 5 to
October 9, 1991. Telephone interviews were conducted by the professional staff on the
Media Research Bureau, University of Missouri, utilizing a random digit dialing
procedure which helped insure coverage of unlisted as well as listed telephones.
Interviews were conducted weekday and evenings and Saturday mornings. The
interviews completed 674 interviews, and the sample is representative of the entire state.
Only registered voters who had voted in either the 1988 or the 1990 general election were
interviewed. Among the respondents, seventy-nine percent claimed to have voted in both
elections which was probably an overstatement. The median age of respondents was
forty-five years. The median years of school completed was about twelve. The sample
was fifty-five percent female, which is a slight over-representation of females. More than
one-fourth were Republican, one-third were Democrat, and over one-third were
Independent, a distribution quite close to national patterns. Almost half the respondents
characterized themselves as "middle of the road," rather than conservative or liberal, a
proportion somewhat higher than the thirty-one percent found nationally in 1988.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss2/3
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know a Missouri judge; four-fifths could not accurately recall a case before the
state Supreme Court; and two-thirds had not read about Missouri judges in the
newspaper. 7'
Considering voters' limited knowledge and experience with courts, the
survey respondents' choice of modest terms in their evaluation of Missouri
courts is not surprising. In evaluating the overall performance of the Missouri
court system, three percent of respondents said it did an excellent job, ten percent
said it did a poor job and the majority gave it a good or fair rating. 72 A more
encouraging pattern for the Plan was the finding that sixty-eight percent who had
personally watched a judge in court and had an opinion gave the judge an
excellent or good rating.73 Concerning voting on the judicial ballot, two-thirds
of the survey respondents recalled seeing the judicial ballot at the last election,
fifty-eight percent claimed to have voted on the question of retention of judges,
fifty-four percent of those who voted indicated they voted to retain most, or all
judges, twenty-eight percent said they voted to retain about half of the judges,
and eighteen percent voted not to retain most, or all judges.7'
In response to the decline in affirmative judicial retention votes, merit plan
judges and others conducted extensive educational and public relations activities
7
regarding the benefits of the Missouri Plan for the 1992 retention elections. 1
The 1992 election yielded a 62.5 percent affirmative retention percentage, an
increase of nearly six percent. The Casey and Leuthold survey measured the
effects of the activities of the Missouri Plan supporters. It indicated that only
one-eighth of the voters were aware of the lawyer ratings of judges conducted
by the Missouri Bar, and only half of those voters were influenced by them.
Nearly one-quarter of the voters had heard pro-merit plan radio ads, and only
half of those voters were influenced by them. Generally, those who were
influenced by either the lawyer rating ofjudges or the radio ads were more likely
to vote affirmatively for judicial retention.76
Election day exit polls indicated that the radio ads were more influential
than the Casey and Leuthold survey had suggested. More than one-third of the
voters were found to have been influenced by the ads, but less than one-quarter
were influenced by the lawyer ratings. Also, more than forty percent of the exit
poll respondents indicated that they were affected by newspaper stories about the
judicial retention elections.77

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Casey & Leuthold, supranote 70, at 5.
Casey & Leuthold, supranote 70, at 2.
Casey & Leuthold, supranote 70, at 2.
Casey & Leuthold, supranote 70, at 2.
See supranotes 47-49 and accompanying text.
Casey & Leuthold, supranote 70, at 2.
Casey & Leuthold, supranote 70, at 2.
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A retention election in the Clay County Circuit Court, located in a
suburban area near Kansas City, also provided some interesting statistical results.
Two circuit judges were on the retention ballot. Judge Michael J. Maloney
received a ninety-three percent approval rating from lawyers, while Judge
Hutcherson received only a twenty-eight percent approval rating.78 Although
"low-key" campaigns were conducted for and against Judge Hutcherson, exit
polling indicated that one-third of the voters were influenced by the lawyers'
ratings. Only one-third of those influenced by the lawyers' ratings voted in the
same direction as the lawyers. The final result was that Judge Hutcherson was
denied retention by a slim margin and Judge Maloney received the highest
percentage of affirmative retention votes of any merit judge on the ballot in
western Missouri."

Of all the judicial retention elections since the passage of the Missouri Plan
in 1940, the 1992 election was the most significant in many respects. This
election provided the first effort by supporters of the Plan to educate the public
in a coordinated fashion aboutjudicial retention elections. Based on the survey
results, this effort to influence the voters was modestly successful. The
$400,000 radio ad campaign conducted by a private group of merit plan
supporters was the most successful of the efforts made, with public appearances
by merit plan judges and distribution of the lawyers' poll running a distant
second and third in effectiveness.
Casey and Leuthold conducted an extensive exit poll and state-wide
telephone survey after the Missouri general election in 1992.0 During this
judicial retention election, all voters in Missouri metropolitan areas had the
opportunity to vote on the retention of at least six judges.8 ' A number of
interesting statistics and trends emerged from the data gathered by Casey and
Leuthold. This survey showed that thirty percent of the voters did not vote at all
on the judicial retention ballot. These voters were characterized as older and
having fewer years of education.82 When asked about information that they had
prior to voting, forty percent of those who voted in the judicial retention election
said that they had no information about the judges. Another ten percent had only
vague information. Those voters possessing no information, who did cast votes,
reported casting about seventy percent affirmative votes on the retention of
judges.83
Voters apparently relied most heavily upon their general evaluation of the
courts and the judiciary in evaluating how they should vote in the judicial

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Casey & Leuthold, supra note 70, at 2.
Casey & Leuthold, supra note 70, at 2.
Casey & Leuthold, supra note 46.
Casey & Leuthold, supranote 46.
Casey & Leuthold, supranote 46.
Casey & Leuthold, supranote 46.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss2/3

12

1997]

Daugherty: Daugherty: Missouri Non-Partisan Court Plan:

MISSOURINON-PARTISAN COURTPLAN

retention elections. This general evaluation was derived from mass media
reports, personal experiences and conversations with others. Polling data
indicated that voters who thought Missouri state courts were doing an excellent
or good job were much more likely to vote for retention than voters who thought
the courts were doing a fair or poor job. 4 Another significant factor was the
voters' general evaluation of the government. This finding also tends to confirm
the relationship between the long term decline in judicial retention voting and the
long term decline in trust in the government."
After the 1992 results, the results of the subsequent judicial retention
elections in 1994 and 1996 are of particular significance. In these elections, the
Missouri Bar extensively distributed the results of the state-wide lawyers' poll
evaluating the judges. However, the 1994 and 1996 elections involved less
extensive public relations activities by merit plan judges, and there was no radio
ad campaign by private merit plan supporters. Nonetheless, the average
affirmative retention vote for all judges in the state-wide retention elections of
1994 remained statistically the same as the 1992 election, with approximately
sixty-three percent voting affirmatively. 6 The 1996 retention election resulted
in an additional modest increase in voter retention percentages to sixty-eight
percent.' Based upon the increase in voter retention percentages from 1990 to
1992 and 1992 through 1996, it appears that the 1992 educational activities may
have been partially responsible for the leveling of affirmative judicial retention
votes. Another possibility, however, is an upturn in voter trust in the judiciary
and the government during this period.88 It is too early to tell whether this is a
definitive trend because of the lack of long-term data.
IV. THE MISSOURI PLAN UNDER LEGISLATIVE ATTACK
The Missouri Non-Partisan Court Plan requires a nominating commission
to select three nominees for a vacant judicial position.89 The nominating
commission is composed of a judge and an equal number of lawyers and lay
persons. From the three nominees chosen by the commission, the governor
selects a judge.9 The central assumption of this non-partisan plan is that the
judicial nominating commission will screen the nominees free from substantial

84. Casey & Leuthold, supranote 46.
85. Casey & Leuthold, supranote 46.
86. Based upon election results from the Missouri Secretary of State's Office for
this period as reviewed by this writer.
87. See supra note 86.
88. Casey & Leuthold, supra note 46, at 2.
89. Mo. CONST. art. V, § 25(a).
90. MO. CONST. art. V, §§ 24,25(a). The composition of the Commission differs
depending on which court level is involved.
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political pressure, and will nominate only the best candidates based on merit.'
However, critics of the Plan began to question this assumption after a highlypublicized scandal involving the Missouri Supreme Court in 1984-85. This
scandal caused a loss of public confidence in the judiciary, which, as previously
stated in the survey data, is the greatest predictor of retention percentages. 92
The Missouri Supreme Court scandal of 1984-85 was the product of
accusations of members of the Supreme Court that other members of the court
were engaging in political activities for the purpose of recruiting new Supreme
Courtjudges 3 This was an abrupt departure from a court tradition that judges
seldom openly bickered among themselves.' In 1982, three vacancies arose on
the seven judge court within five months, and one sitting judge allegedly
manipulated the merit plan to "hand-pick" three new members of the court.95
Newspapers in the state carried many reports of the dispute and as press
coverage grew, one of the judges resigned to be appointed to the United States
District Court in St. Louis.96 With his resignation, the judicial nominating
commission provided the governor with three nominees, one of whom included
the governor's thirty-three year old gubernatorial chief of staff, who had no
judicial experience. Eventually, the governor appointed his gubernatorial aide
to the vacant seat. "A hue and cry was raised in protest over the alleged
violation of the spirit of the Missouri Plan, but to no avail. The gubernatorial
aide was seated on the court and easily won retention in 1986."17
At the peak of the controversy, adverse publicity questioned the legitimacy
of the Missouri Non-Partisan Court Plan. Prior to this time, few legislative
efforts had been made to modify the Plan. However, this adverse publicity
appeared to generate an annual effort by members of the legislature to propose
constitutional amendments in an attempt to replace or modify the Plan. 9
Reconstituting judicial commissions has always been one of the primary
methods reformers and opponents of merit plans have utilized to create a more
equitable commission, to dilute power, or to regain control of a nominating
system that is not serving their purposes.

91. See Glick, supra note 30, at 513.
92. Aspin & Hall, supranote 56.
93. Gregory Casey, PublicPerceptionofJudicialScandal: The MissouriSupreme
Court 1982-1988, 13 JUST. SYs. J. 284-85 (1989).

94. Id. at 285.
95. Id. at 289.
96. Id.

97. Id. at 289-90.
98. H.R.J. Res. 48, 85th Leg., 2d Sess. (1990); H.R.J. Res. 5, 86th Leg., 1st Sess.
(1991); S.J. Res. 38, 86th Leg., 2d Sess. (1992); H.R.J. Res. 4, 6, 87th Leg., 1st Sess.

(1993).
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From 1990 through 1993, several bills introduced in the Missouri House of
Representatives sought to exclusively or partially reconstitute the judicial
nominating commissions for the Missouri Non-Partisan Court Plan.19 The
essence of these early bills was to keep the standard seven member judicial
nominating commission: three lay members, three elected bar association
members and the chief judge of the Supreme Court. However, the method of
appointing the three lay members would be changed to allow the governor,
lieutenant governor and president pro-tem of the Senate one appointment each."
In 1992, Senate Joint Resolution No. 38 proposed expanding the judicial
nominating commission to eleven members composed of four lay persons, six
lawyers and one judge. Again, the emphasis in the bill was to delineate who
would appoint the lay members of the commission. In this case, one lay member
was to be appointed by the governor, lieutenant governor, president pro-tem of
the Senate and the Speaker of the House.'' Then in 1993, a bill was introduced
in the House of Representatives to provide for the appointment of the lay
members to the judicial commission by the governor for six years and staggered
terms, with the advise and consent of the Senate. 2
Other provisions inserted into these bills during this period include: (1) the
ability of eight percent of the registered voters in a judge's geographical area to
sign a petition to require a special retention election;"°3 (2) requiring the advice
and consent of the Senate for all persons selected as judges under the Missouri
Plan; ° and (3) a resolution that race and gender be taken into account when
appointing commission members. 05 To date, while some of these bills have
gathered support, none have been enacted into law.
After the appointment of the governor's chief of staff to the Missouri
Supreme Court, members of the Missouri General Assembly became concerned
with cronyism in the judicial commission appointive process. Several bills were
introduced in the House of Representatives and the Senate with provisions
regarding the ethics of the commission and the executive in judicial
appointments. The first bill, introduced in 1989, prohibited the governor from
communicating directly or indirectly with members of the judicial nominating
commission when a judicial vacancy occurred, until the nominees were
submitted to the governor for his selection."° Legislators also introduced bills
attempting to reduce the governor's input. These bills prohibited the governor

99. See supra note 98.
100. See supra note 98.
101. S.J. Res. 38, 86th Leg., 2d Sess. (1992).
102. H.R.J. Res. 4, 6, 87th Leg., 1st Sess. (1993).
103. H.R.J. Res. 4, 6, 87th Leg., 1st Sess. (1993).
104. H.R.J. Res. 13, 85th Leg., 1st Sess. (1989).
105. S.J. Res. 38, 86th Leg., 2d Sess. (1992).
106. S.J. Res. 38, 86th Leg., 2d Sess. (1992).
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from seeking prior commitments from nominees on any issues that might come
before a judge after they assumed office °7 and from seeking commitments from
potential judicial commission nominees who might agree to support the
nomination of any specific person as ajudge.' °8
Additional changes proposed in both the House of Representatives and the
Senate sought to modify the required retention percentages and place term
limitations on all judges in the State of Missouri. In 1992, both the House of
Representatives and the Senate introduced legislation imposing a change in the
required affirmative retention percentage to sixty percent, replacing the fifty
percent level of the last fifty years."° This must have appeared to be a drastic
remedy to many judges, as most would have been voted out of office in 1990
had a sixty percent retention percentage been applicable at that time." 0 In
addition to this proposed change, the House of Representatives in 1993 not only
proposed the reconstituting of the judicial nominating commission with the
advise and consent of the Senate, but also sought to impose a twelve year term
limit for all judges in Missouri.' Again, while gathering support, none of this
legislation passed.
The initial effort to have the Missouri Non-Partisan Court Plan abolished
in Missouri arose in the House of Representatives in 1988. The proposed bill
would cause all counties currently under the Missouri Plan to readopt the Plan,
or revert to direct elections."' Subsequently, in 1991, African-American
members of the House of Representatives proposed House Joint Resolution No.
25 to abolish the Missouri Non-Partisan Court Plan." 3 This bill sought to divide
the state into sub-districts, without any two judges coming from the same subdistrict." 4 It called for the direct election of judges in partisan elections from
each of those sub-districts. Supreme Court judges would run in a particular subdistrict, as would all appellate and circuit judges." 5 This effort to abolish the
Missouri Plan died in the legislature after spirited debate.
The protests over the violation of the spirit of the Missouri Plan and the
independent controversy in the Supreme Court has created rancor and
dissatisfaction among certain members of the public and the legislature. To date,

107.
108.
109.
110.
(1992).
111.
112.
113.

H.R.J. Res. 48, 85th Leg., 2d Sess. (1990).
S.J. Res. 1, 18, 37, 86th Leg., 1st Sess. (1992).
S.J. Res. 1, 18, 37, 86th Leg., 1st Sess. (1992).
S.J. Res. 39, 86th Leg., 2d Sess. (1992); H.R.J. Res. 53, 86th Leg., 2d Sess.
H.R.J. Res. 4,6.
H.R.J. Res. 4, 6.
H.R.J. Res. 25, 86th Leg., 2d Sess. (1991). The sponsor of this bill was

Representative Elbert A. Walton, Jr.
114. H.R.J. Res. 25, 86th Leg., 2d Sess. (1991).
115. H.R.J, Res. 25, 86th Leg., 2d Sess. (1991).
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the various bills seeking the elimination or modification of the Plan have been
unsuccessful. Based on the state's political history and its status as the state in
which the Plan originated, it is likely that the various reforms proposed in the
legislature face long odds for passage. It seems that further scandals and racial
inequities will not change the minds of the "cynical standpatters."' 6 "[The]
lawyers' opposition to change together with the 'show-me opposition' to change
in general... [the] passage of any constitutional amendment to alter the court's
position [is] unlikely."' 7
V. CHALLENGES TO THE MISSOURI PLAN
UTILIZING THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT

While minority groups have attempted to utilize legislative efforts to level
the judicial playing field, constitutionally based litigation has been the primary
mechanism used to abolish formal, informal, legal and political barriers to racial
equality in judicial selection."' In 1965, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act
which effectively resurrected the Fifteenth Amendment giving AfricanAmericans and civil rights activists a tool to use against racial discrimination." 9
However, passage of the Voting Rights Act did not remove all of the barriers to
voting inequalities. Thus, in 1982, the Voting Rights Act was amended,
"infusing the act with new life."' 2 ° Section Two of the Voting Rights Act
prohibits any "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice,
or procedure.., which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any
citizen... to vote on account of race or color."'' A violation of this Act occurs
if a class of citizens protected under the Act "ha[s] less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of [its] choice.""z Since the passage of this 1982 amendment,
claims based on the Voting Rights Act have increased. Recently, several of
these claims have involved challenges to state and local judicial elections.Y

116. Casey, supranote 94, at 284.
117. Casey, supranote 94, at 284.
118. April D. Dulaney, A JudicialExceptionfor JudicialElections: "A Burning
Scar on the Voting Rights Act, " 65 TUL. L. REV. 1223 (1991); David M. Gelfand, Voting
Rights and the DemocraticProcess: Ongoing Struggles and ContinuingQuestions, 17
URB.LAW. 333 (1985).

119. Dulaney, supra note 118.
120. Dulaney, supranote 118.
121. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1994).
122. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1994).
123. See Dulaney, supra note 118; Gelfand, supra note 118; L. McDonald, The
Effects of the 1982 Amendments to Amendments to Section 2 ofthe Voting Rights Act
on Minority Representation (1990) (paper prepared for the conference on the 25th
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Defenders of the judicial "status quo" have argued that the new language of
Section Two exempts traditional contested judicial elections from coverage. In
both Chisom v. Edwards'24 and Mallory v. Eyrich,'" federal district courts
adopted the defendant state official's argument that the new language of Section
Two exempts contested judicial elections from coverage. Both of these
decisions, however, were reversed on appeal.' 26
Litigation utilizing Section Two of the Voting Rights Act as originally
enacted worked in conjunction with the Fifteenth Amendment. Prior to the
amendment of Section Two, it was clear that it applied to contested judicial
elections. 2 7 However, after the amendment of Section Two, there was some
2
dispute over whether or not Section Two still applied to judicial elections.1 1
Martin v. Allain'29 was the first post-amendment case to consider the
requirements of the Voting Rights Act as it relates to judicial selection methods.
In that case, a Mississippi federal district court found that a multi-member, atlarge system of electing judges in Mississippi diluted black voting strength and
violated Section Two of the Act. 30
The application of Section Two of the Voting Rights Act to judicial
elections was again questioned in 1988, when the Sixth Circuit in Mallory v.
Eyrich 3 ' decided that Section Two of the Voting Rights Act applied to Ohio's
judicial elections. In Mallory, it was argued that the term "representatives" in
Section Two excluded judges. The defendants believed judges could never be
considered representatives since judges, by definition, were to be independent.'
However, the circuit court in Mallory stated that "everything contained in the
report indicates that the 1982 amendment was intended to effect an expansion,
rather than a contraction, of the applicability of the act."' 3 In Mallory, the court
believed that Congress was seeking a broader word to make it clear that Section

Anniversary of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and made available by the Brookings
Institution).
124. 659 F. Supp. 183 (E.D. La. 1987), rev'd, 839 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied,488 U.S. 955 (1988).
125. 666 F. Supp. 1060 (S.D. Ohio 1987), rev'd, 839 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1988).
126. See Chisom, 659 F. Supp., 183 (E.D. La. 1987), rev'd,839 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir.
1988); Mallory, 666 F. Supp. 1060 (S.D. Ohio 1987), rev'd, 839 F.2d 275 (6th Cir.
1988).
127. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991).
128. Thomas P. Prehoditch, The Voting Rights Act and Judicial Selection
Litigation;An Evaluationof Remedial Options, 11 REV. LITIG. 523 (1992).
129. 658 F. Supp. 1183 (S.D. Miss. 1987).
130. Id.at 1204. See also Martin v. Mabus, 700 F. Supp. 327 (S.D. Miss. 1988).
131. 839 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1988).
132. Id. at 279.
133. Id.
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Two applied not only to legislative races, but to all elected officials and
elections.' Similarly, the Fifth Circuit, reversing its earlier holding in Chisom
v. Edwards,3 ' held in LULAC v. Clements'36 that Section Two of the Voting
Rights Act does not apply to judicial elections. With these broad interpretations,
challenges to judicial selection methods have increased and have involved
Louisiana, Ohio, Mississippi, North Carolina, Alabama, Florida, Georgia,
Illinois, Arkansas, Texas, Indiana and Missouri.'37

Subsequently, in 1992, in Houston Lawyers' Association v. Attorney
GeneralofTexas, 138 the United States Supreme Court reviewed the rationale of
the various lower court decisions. The lower courts had reasoned that a trial
judge, unlike an appellate judge who acts as a member of a collegial body, "is
a single officeholder who has the jurisdiction that is co-extensive with the
geographic area from which she or he is elected and has the authority to render
final opinions independently of other judges serving in the same area or on the
same court."' 319 These lower courts had concluded that exemption from Section

Two of elections for single trial judges was justified and cited the state's
compelling interest in linking jurisdiction to the elective base for judges who act
alone." They also explained that attempting to break that linkage might dilute
minority influence by making only a few judges principally accountable to the
minority electorate, rather than making all of them partly accountable to minority
voters.' 4' The United States Supreme Court, reversing the decision of the lower
courts, held that judicial elections are not categorically excluded from coverage

134. Id.
135. Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1988).

136. League of United Latin American Citizens Counsel No. 4434 v. Clements,
914 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc), rev' sub nom. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v.
Attorney General of Texas, 501 U.S. 419 (1991).
137. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991); League of United Latin American
Citizens Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 902 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 914 F.2d
620 (5th Cir. 1990) (en bane), rev'd sub nom. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n y. Attorney
General of Texas, 501 U.S. 419 (1991); Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir.
1988); Mallory v. Eyrich, 839 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1988); African-American Voting Rights
Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Missouri, No. 4:92CV00973 (E.D. Mo. 1993); Bradley v.
Indiana State Election Bd., 797 F. Supp. 694 (S.D. Ind. 1992); Hunt v. Arkansas, No.
PB-C-89-406 (E.D. Ark. 1989); Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Siegleman,
714 F. Supp. 511 (M.D. Ala. 1989); Martin v. Mabus, 700 F. Supp. 327 (S.D. Miss.
1988); Williams v. State Bd. of Elections, 696 F. Supp. 1563 (N.D. Ill. 1988); and Clark
v. Edwards, 725 F. Supp. 285 (M.D. La. 1988).
138. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney General of Texas, 501 U.S. 419 (1991).
139. Id. at 419.
140. Id. at 420.
141. Id.
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and therefore, once a state decides to elect its trial judges, those elections must
142
be conducted in compliance with the Voting Rights Act.
On the same day, the Court also ruled on Chisom v. Roemer.143 Chisom
involved the seven-member Louisiana Supreme Court, whose members were
elected from both single and multi-member districts. 44 The lower court had
concluded that judges were not "representatives" under the terms of Section Two
and that, therefore, judicial elections were not covered by Section Two. 4 In
Chisom, the Supreme Court expanded upon the rationale behind Houston
Lawyers'Association. It determined that Section Two protected the right to vote
without making any distinctions or limitations as to which elections would fall
within its purview. 46 The Supreme Court quoted former Attorney General
Katzenbach, who during hearings on the passage of the Voting Rights Act
amendments in 1982 stated that the Act would cover "every election in which
registered electors are permitted to vote....1141
Further, the Court rejected the narrow construction of the word
"representative." It reasoned that if Congress had intended such a narrow
interpretation, it would have explicitly stated that narrow definition and would
have mentioned it in the unusually extensive legislative history of the 1982
amendments.1 48 The Court further reasoned that when Congress replaced the
word "legislatures" with "representatives," it became clear that Congress
intended the amendment to cover more than just legislative elections. 49 In
closing, the Supreme Court reiterated that the Act must be interpreted in a
manner that provides the "broadest possible scope" in order to combat racial
discrimination in voting.' 50
Under these decisions, it is clear that the Voting Rights Act and its
subsequent amendments are applicable to directly contested judicial elections.
However, the Voting Rights Act does not apply to the purely appointive judicial
selection methods utilized in many states and at the federal level, because no
voting or election process is involved.'' The Court stated that "[t]he word
'representative' refers to someone who has prevailed in a popular election." 5 2
Because Louisiana had decided to elect its judges, it is reasonable to characterize

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 426-27.
501 U.S. 380 (1991).
Id.
Id. at 385-86.
Id. at 391-400.
Id. at 391.
Id. at 395.
Id. at 399.
Id. at 403. See also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315 (1966).
Roemer, 501 U.S. at 399-401.
Id.
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the winners as representatives. Specifically, the Court said, "Louisiana could,
of course, exclude its judiciary from the coverage of the [Act] by changing to a
system in which judges are appointed."'' 3 Therefore, states have the ability to
choose whether or not their judges are subject to the Voting Rights Act by
determining which selection method for judges will be utilized. If a state decides
to elect judges and compels them to seek popular support like4 other political
candidates, then the Voting Rights Act is applicable to them.1
The applicability of the Voting Rights Act to direct judicial elections and
its inapplicability to appointive judicial selection methods have been resolved.
However, there has been no resolution regarding the Voting Rights Act's
application to various hybrid methods ofjudicial selection, such as the Missouri
Plan and other merit plans. The Voting Rights Act has been a tool used by
minority groups to remedy racial discrimination in judicial elections. These
groups are now beginning to turn their attention to the hybrid judicial selection
plans that have a retention vote component.
The Missouri Plan and other non-partisan methods ofjudicial selection have
an appointive component for the first stage ofjudicial selection and a retention
election component for the second stage. Two cases in the federal district courts
may answer or address the question of whether or not appointive systems with
retention election components are subject to coverage of Section Two of the
Voting Rights Act.
In African-American Voting Rights and Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Missouri,"I the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri overruled the
State's motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment as to. the
applicability of the Voting Rights Act to the Missouri Non-Partisan Court
Plan. ' 6 The State argued that the Missouri Plan is not subject to the Voting
Rights Act for two primary reasons: (1) judges are appointed and appointive
judicial positions are clearly not covered by the Act, and (2) retention elections
are not elections in the conventional sense because the judge does not have an
opponent.5 7 In the late summer of 1995, a trial on the merits was held to
determine whether or not the Voting Rights Act applies to retention elections,
whether that act has been violated and if so, whether any remedies are
appropriate. As of January 1997, a decision had not been rendered.
In Bradley v. Indiana State Election Board,'58 a federal district court
addressed whether judicial retention elections in Indiana fall under the ambit of
the Voting Rights Act. The Superior Court of Indiana, Lake County, has four

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id.
Id.
No. 4:92CV00973 (E.D. Mo. 1993).
Id.
Id.

158. 797 F. Supp. 694 (S.D. Ind. 1992).
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divisions. In three of those divisions, the governor selects a judge from a list of
three nominees submitted by a seven member judicial nominating commission
to fill vacancies on the court." 9 Once appointed, ajudge serves for six years, but
then must submit to an at-large, county-wide retention vote. If the judge fails to
be retained, the commission submits another list of nominees. 60 However, if the
judge wins retention, then he or she holds office for another six-year term. Of
6
the thirteen judges on this court, only one is African-American.' '
African-American citizens of voting age, living in Indiana, initiated a
lawsuit alleging that this selection and retention system violates the Voting
Rights Act by depriving the African-American voters of a fair opportunity to
elect or select judges. 62 They argued that the practice of holding at-large,
county-wide retention elections violates the Act by diluting African-American
votes. The defendants, the judicial nominating committee and the judges
currently on the court, filed a motion to dismiss stating that the Act does not
apply to them because they are appointed by the governor and are not elected by
popular vote.'63 The defendants argued that Chisom v. Roemer'" defines
"representatives" in Section Two of the Act as being winners of representative,
popular elections.
Consequently, the non-partisan judges are not
"representatives" within the meaning of the Act, since they never take part in
such elections. Also, the defendants argued that dicta in Chisom asserted that a
state can "exclude its judiciary from the coverage of the [Act] by changing to a
system in which judges are appointed," such as exists in non-partisan court plan
states. 165
The district court in Bradley held that the Act applies to retention elections,
but that it does not govern the nomination and appointment procedures.' 61 In
applying the Act to the retention component, but not to the appointment
component, the court stated, "[e]ven read narrowly, Chisom seems to make clear
that such [appointment] processes, which do not involve 'voting,' fall outside the
Act." 67 The Bradley court reasoned that Section Fourteen of the Act "defines
the term 'voting' to include 'all action necessary to make a vote effective in any
primary, special or general election,' including the casting of ballots 'with
respect to candidates for public or party office and propositions for which votes

159. Id. at 695.
160. Id.

161. Id. at 695-96.
162. Id. at 696.
163. Id. at 696-97.
164. 501 U.S. 380 (1991).

165. Chisom, 797 F. Supp. at 697-98.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 698.
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are received in an election."""8 In Bradley, the court found the Act employed
expansive definitions and had to be interpreted with the broadest possible
scope.' 69 Thus, the Act has been interpreted to "reachi] far beyond the common
understanding of these [basic electoral] terms" and "encompass[es] any
'proposition for which votes are received in an election."' Under this rationale,
the elective decision to retain ajudge easily constitutes such a "proposition."170
The court in Bradley recognized the persuasiveness of the defendant's argument
that retention elections cannot violate Section Two because nobody, white or
black, gets to choose representatives of their choice; voters simply say "yes," or
"no" to the retention of appointed judges.' If nobody gets an opportunity to
select representatives of their choice, blacks do not have "less" opportunity than
whites, which is required for a violation of Section Two to exist. The court
had some appeal, it was not strong enough
indicated that, while this argument
72
to sustain a motion to dismiss.
Initially, it appeared that there would not be a full resolution of this case.
After the court ruled in part on the motion to dismiss, the Indiana legislature
passed a new statute that diversifies the nominating commission, requiring a mix
of gender and race on the commission. For a time it appeared this action by the
state legislature would satisfy the plaintiffs and result in settlement or dismissal
of the case. The new statute creates a commission of nine members. It includes
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Indiana, four attorney members
selected by the licensed attorneys of Lake County, and four non-attorney citizens
of Lake County. The non-attorney members were appointed by the governor
under the old law, but are now appointed by members of the Lake County Board
of Commissioners. The commission recommends the "three most highly
qualified candidates" to the governor who makes the selections. 7 1 Under the
new law, "[i]n determining which eligible candidates shall be recommended to
that racial and gender diversity
the governor, the commission shall consider
174
enhances the quality of the judiciary."'
Subsequently, the plaintiffs did not dismiss their action but asked the court
to rule on the motion for summary judgment and the motion to dismiss. The
court ruled that Section Two of the Act does not apply to claims relating to the
selection of attorney members of commissions in a hybrid system of judicial
appointments and subsequent retention elections. 75 Regarding the voters'

168. Id. at 697.
169. Id. at 698.
170. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
171. Bradley v. Indiana State Election Bd., 797 F. Supp. 694, 698 (S.D. Ind. 1992).
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objection that only attorneys were allowed to vote for attorney members of the
commission, the Court held that "[n]o fundamental rights are implicated nor
suspect classes created by the current system, and the state's decision... is
rationally related to a legitimate purpose.' 17 6 Consequently, this "'hybrid'
method of judicial selection does not fall clearly into either category of
appointed judge or popularly elected judge."'" By choosing a system where its
judges are appointed, Indiana has excluded the judiciary from coverage under
Section Two, and that exclusion extends to the entire appointive process. 7 ,
Members of the commission are not "representatives" under the act but are
merely assisting the governor in the appointive process. The governor, not the
commission, is accountable to the electorate for the appointment of judges. 17 9
While it appears that the retention election component of the Missouri Plan may
be subject to the Voting Rights Act, it is quite uncertain the extent and type of
proof that will be necessary in order to successfully invalidate such a plan.
In light of Bradley,are-examination of Chisom is appropriate. Chisom held
that judicial elections were covered by Section Two, as the word
"representatives" describes the winners of representative, popular elections,
including elected judges. 80 Therefore, plaintiffs can prevail on a Section Two
claim by demonstrating that a challenged election practice has resulted in the
denial or encroachment of the right to vote based on color or race. This
application of a "results test" requires an inquiry into "the totality of the
circumstances."'' Since the 1982 amendment of Section Two, discriminatory
intent is no longer necessary to establish a violation of this section. 8 2 The
Chisom court stated that the "inability to elect representatives of their choice is
not sufficient to establish a violation unless, under the totality of the
circumstances, it can also be said that as members of the protected class they
have less opportunity to participate in the political process."'83
Chisom also reveals that the nomination of judges by a commission, with
subsequent appointment by a governor, would not fall under the Act, as that is
not an "election" where popular vote is required. However, giving the Act its
broadest interpretation, the retention election components may fall under the Act,
as the terms "vote" and "voting" are defined by the Act to include "all action

176. Id. at 1455-56, 1474. The additional claims of the plaintiffs were denied on
other grounds.
177. Bradley v. Indiana State Election Bd., 797 F. Supp. 694,698 (S.D. Ind. 1992).
178. Bradley v. Work, 916 F. Supp. 1446, 1454 (S.D. Ind. 1996).
179. Id. at 1454-55.
180. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991).
181. Id. at 393.
182. Id. at 396-97.
183. Id. at 398-99.
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necessary to make a vote effective in any primary, special or general election."'
The statute further defines the word "vote" as "votes cast with respect to
candidates for public or party office and propositions for which votes are
received in an election."' 85 It is not a stretch to derive from this that an
unopposed judge in a retention election is at least in an election comparable to
a vote on a proposition.
VI. CONCLUSION AND ANALYSIS
The focus ofjudicial selection must be independence. In a representative
democracy, the people speak directly through two branches of our government.
In order to protect and ensure liberty for all citizens it is vital that judicial
independence be preserved. The partial failing of the Missouri Plan as it
currently exists arises from a selection and retention method that can be
exclusive, secretive and political. The survival of the Plan and of judicial
independence in this changing socio-legal environment requires adaptations and
modifications of the selection and retention process. The changes that are made
should preserve judicial independence, while simultaneously enhancing the
fairness and inclusiveness of the selection and retention process.
There have been significant problems with the implementation of the NonPartisan Court Plan in Missouri and elsewhere. Presently, the prospects for the
survival of the Missouri Plan are perhaps more precarious than supporters of the
Plan realize or care to admit. The recent challenges to the Plan arise from the
desire for a representative judiciary that is more accountable to the public, yet
retains some professional independence. However, these qualities of
accountability and independence compete with each other and may ultimately
be irreconcilable concepts. The non-partisan court plan method of judicial
selection and retention was created in an effort to balance these competing
concepts. Historically, it is clear that the Plan was designed to allow competent
judges to serve long tenures with little electoral accountability. Consequently,
the public could remove judges only under unusual circumstances.
The Missouri Plan has evolved into the most pervasive method of judicial
selection in the country. Advocates stress the Plan's emphasis on professional
qualifications rather than political influence, pre-appointment merit screening,
little need to campaign or raise funds, and promotion of judicial stability.
Opponents argue that politics still play an important role at the commission and
appointment levels, that the process is secretive, and that judges are seldom
voted out and thus, they are not accountable to the public.
In Missouri, the Plan was created in response to corruption and machine
politics. With these problems fading from the public's memory, critics are free
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to attack the Plan on its perceived failure of accountability. The three threats to
the Plan outlined in this article (lack of faith in government by the general
public, legislative attacks, and Voting Rights Act challenges by minorities) are
each independently capable of altering or eliminating the Plan. The primary
threat to the Plan may be the public's growing lack of faith in all government
and public institutions. This lack of faith has spilled over into the law and the
judicial retention elections. Consequently, the lower affirmative retention
percentages may not be caused by any "coordinated" attack on the judiciary, but
instead may merely reflect the public cynicism of the times.
Legislative efforts to reform or eliminate the Missouri Plan also appear to
be in response to the public's call for accountability on the part of all
government officials. Opponents of the Plan support the legislative efforts to
make judicial commissions ethical, representative and open, and to limit the
governor's ability to influence the commission or "hand pick" candidates. With
this legislative support, renewed efforts will likely occur to place term limitations
on judicial offices, or to raise the required affirmative retention percentage. At
this point, the Plan has survived legislative attacks in Missouri and elsewhere
because the powerful legal interest groups (trial lawyers, defense lawyers, bar
associations and judges) have successfully lobbied legislatures to support the
Plan. However, to ultimately ensure its survival, defenders must consider
changing the Plan to mollify its critics.
The most significant basis for legal challenge to the Plan is the Voting
Rights Act. Lawsuits arising from the Act are filed based on the belief that
judges selected and retained under the Missouri Plan are not representative of
minorities. For a Section Two violation of the Voting Rights Act to exist, the
Plan must be covered the Act. If the Plan is found to be covered by the Act, the
"results test" is then applied to determine whether there has been a violation of
the Act. This test inquires into the "totality of the circumstances" to determine
if members of the protected class have less opportunity to participate in the
political process.
Those who claim the Plan results in under-representation of minorities may
find it difficult to prove that the Plan violates the Act. In retention elections
nobody gets to select the representatives, rather voters simply vote for or against
retention of the appointed judges. If a violation is established regarding the
retention component of the Plan, federal courts may create subdistricts for
retention elections and leave the appointment process of the Plan intact. If a
violation is established regarding the appointment process, reconstitution of
nominating commissions so that they have minority and gender representation
may provide a remedy.
From each of these threats to the Plan, consistent themes emerge. As
originally created, the Plan emphasized the "apolitical" nomination of merit
qualified persons by a "representative" commission. In Missouri, the judicial
nominating commission is composed of three lay persons, three attorneys and the
chief judge of the state Supreme Court. This is the typical way in which such
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss2/3
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commissions are structured. Any attorney meeting the age and citizenship
requirements imposed by the state constitution may apply for the judicial
vacancy. The commission then interviews the candidates and nominates three
persons. The governor selects from those three persons and at the next regular
election, the people vote on retention. The challengers are concerned that the
Plan is too political and lacks representation and accountability. In many
respects, the challengers may be correct. A given governor may possess too
much control over the commission because of his/her ability to select, precommit and lobby lay commissioners for their support. The white male majority
of the bar effectively selects the other three lawyer members of the commission.
The head of the commission, the state supreme court chief judge, is the product
of the same commission on which he now sits. Along with the political and bar
related lobbying of commission members, these factors, at the very least, result
in a selection process that appears to some to be too secretive, undemocratic, not
representative, too political, and not accountable or responsive to the public.
Based on the results of survey data and other research conducted on the loss
of public confidence and decline in retention rates, the following
recommendations are suggested to help eliminate the political nature, secrecy
and non-representativeness aspects of the Missouri Plan, and to help insure its
survival:
(1) Reconstitute the judicial nominating commissions for greater
representation from minorities and women;
(2) Mandate ethics rules applicable to all participants in the selection
process;
(3) Open commission interviews of candidates to the public and the
press;
(4) Promote greater cooperation between the bench and bar through
wide distribution of surveys by attorneys evaluating the judges'
performance;
(5) Create independent judicial assessment groups composed of lay
persons, attorneys, or legal interest groups to assess and report on the
judges' performance;
(6) Utilize the mass media to educate the electorate about the benefits
of the Plan;
(7) Use professional public relations consultants to assist the courts in
communicating with the public; and
(8) Encourage further use of cameras in the courtroom to help inform
the public about how courts function.
The most significant of these recommendations is the reformation of the
judicial nominating commission. The commission is the cornerstone of a nonpartisan merit plan. It must be apolitical and representative. To promote
representation and to dilute political influence, a state should consider a model
judicial commission of nine members: the chiefjudge of the state supreme court
(when nominating for the supreme court, then use the statewide bar president);
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four attorneys elected by the district bar, at least one of which must be a woman
and at least one a member of the district's largest minority group; and four lay
persons, two each from the largest political parties, and of these four, at least one
must be a woman and at least one a member of the district's largest minority
group. The lay members could be elected by the public, or the state's four
highest elected officials could each appoint one. This process and composition
would promote representation, reduce politics, enhance gender and minority
participation, and gamer wider public acceptance.
The second most important recommendation is the establishment of tough
ethical rules for commission members, participating elected officials, judicial
candidates and members of the bar. These rules should promote the apolitical
nature of the process and discourage unethical communication between the
interested parties. These rules should also prohibit the governor from
communicating directly or indirectly with the commission when a judicial seat
is vacant, seeking precominitments from judicial nominees on issues that might
come before them as judges, and seeking prior commitments from commission
nominees for support of any specific person as a judge. Regarding the
commissioners, one suggested rule would require all commission members to
disclose the identity and content of all contacts with judicial candidates or their
supporters. The primary focus of these recommended rules is to limit or
discourage political influence, and instead concentrate on the merits and
qualifications of the candidates.
Another recommendation that could increase public understanding and
acceptance while reducing secrecy is to open the interview process to the public
and the press. The interviews could be conducted on a public access television
or radio channel giving interested persons the opportunity to observe. The
commission could also provide limited access to the interview room by the
public and press. Again, this reduces secrecy and increases public understanding
of the process.
The fourth recommendation concerns the use of the mass media to educate
the electorate about the benefits of the Plan and the legal system. This
recommendation is intertwined with the recommendation that large courts hire
professional media relations personnel and encourage cameras in the courtroom.
Judges and lawyers in Plan states are inexperienced, ill-equipped and ethically
limited from communicating virtues and triumphs of the system. Professional
media assistance can help courts promote stories for television, radio and print
media, and take advantage of positive attitudes toward the legal system. An
aggressive "corporate" image-building approach to speaking engagements,
public appearances and other media contacts can effectively communicate the
theme and message desired by the court. While this aggressive and pro-active
approach might be distasteful to isolated and independent merit plan judges, this
educational and media-oriented process is vital in order to separate public
cynicism toward government from the judiciary and retention elections.
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Lastly, the creation of independent judicial assessment mechanisms (bar
polls and court watchers) that are believable, trustworthy and easily
communicated to the public are essential. These give voters guidance in
retention elections where voting cues are absent and votes are cast based on their
generalized sentiments concerning the government. Many states have organized
bar polls conceming judicial performance. However, fewer states employ "court
watcher" groups where lay persons observe, assess and report on judicial
performance. Research has shown that both of these judicial assessment tools
are poorly communicated to the electorate, but when communicated are quite
effective and influential. The focus of these judicial assessment efforts should
be to unite these professional and lay groups. Undoubtedly, these assessment
tools are useful in aggressively marketing the results to a public that wants and
needs voting cues for judges on retention ballots.
The Missouri Plan was created to balance the competing concepts of
judicial independence and accountability. As it currently exists, many perceive
the Plan to be inadequate for the changing socio-legal landscape of today. These
proposed recommendations should appease opponents of the Plan, while
maintaining the independence desired by supporters of the Plan.
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